

THE IDEAL COURTIER: PINDAR AND HIERON IN PYTHIAN 2

There is some audacity in adding to the formidable list of articles on *Pythian* 2, which raise the questions of the structure or thematic coherence of the ode, of its specific occasion and of its relation to Pindar's biography. In this paper my aim is the circumscribed one of showing how a correct analysis of the final section of the poem (lines 72–end) can lead us to a better understanding of the nature of Pindar's poetry, and of the way in which he adapts his laudatory stance to the circumstances and status of the addressee.

For Wilamowitz,¹ *Pythian* 2 was the document of a beleaguered aristocratic poet justifying his cultivation of princes. While the picture of the poem as an apology may be regarded as an over-statement, it would not be surprising if a very formal style, developed for and chiefly exercised in the praise of aristocratic patrons whom Pindar could, without special pleading, regard as his equals, should need adaptation when directed to a tyrant whose status, power and demands were of a far more elevated nature. In this poem Pindar develops a mode of speech to suit a courtier, not a peer.

Lines 67–71 have a formal parallel in *N.* 3. 76 ff., χαῖρε, φίλος· ἐγὼ τόδε τοι πέμπω μεμιγμένον μέλι λευκῷ σὺν γάλακτι... πόμ' αἰοίδιμον, where the statement that the poet sends a gift concludes the main course of the poem and clears the way for a direct statement of praise. The final triad (plus one line) of *P.* 2 thus formally corresponds to a final assertion of praise: the reasons for its unusual length and complexity I hope to make clear in what follows.

The final crescendo of the poem begins at line 72, with a resounding asyndeton, γένοι' οἶος ἐσσι μαθών. With Lloyd-Jones,² I would take οἶος ἐσσι with both verb and participle: 'learning of what nature thou art, become what thou art'. Pindar goes on to state in the subsequent lines what he considers Hieron's nature to be.

Several important points are already raised here. The 'become what you are' theme has been much discussed,³ and it is not hard to multiply parallel examples of the topic.⁴ It is one thing to recognize a human ideal, another to give it a form and context appropriate to the circumstances in which Pindar uttered it. A remarkable parallel is offered by a passage in Max Müller's commonplace book for 2 May 1881: 'Royalty seldom have any inducement to try to appear different from what they are, or to disguise what they think and feel. A king or a prince does not generally want to become anything else, and as they want nothing from anybody, they are not likely to scheme, to flatter, or to deceive.'⁵ Pindar's statement of this characteristic of princes is

¹ *Pindaros* (Berlin, 1922), p. 293.

² *JHS* 93 (1973), 124; also C. J. Carey, *Commentary on Five Odes of Pindar* (Arno Press, N.Y., 1981), p. 49.

³ See *Exkurs* II in O. Schroeder, *Pindars Pythien* (Leipzig, 1922).

⁴ Schroeder had already cited Polonius' 'To thine own self be true; thou canst not then be false to any man', one of the key texts of Lionel Trilling's survey of two traditions of manners in *Sincerity and Authenticity* (Oxford, 1974). The phrase finds echoes in Goethe and Nietzsche, and is at the root of the German idea of 'Bildung'. Nearer to Pindar's world, 'soy quien soy' is a keynote of Spanish traditional culture, as discussed by J. Pitt-Rivers in J. G. Peristany (ed.) *Honour and Shame. The Values of Mediterranean Society* (1966), p. 22; cf. p. 35, where it is expanded as 'you are who you associate with'. Cf. also T. Hooker, *Essay on Honour* (London, 1741).

⁵ Cited by N. C. Chaudhri, *Scholar Extraordinary: the life of... Max Müller* (London, 1974), p. 77.

presented in the imperative, as a piece of advice.⁶ There may have been in archaic Greece a 'sub-genre' of 'Advice to Princes',⁷ but as Lloyd-Jones rightly says,⁸ 'we should guard against assuming that Pindar thinks that without his exhortation Hieron could not behave nobly'. Nevertheless, advice can often be the most subtle form of praise. As the philosophers put it, 'ought' implies 'can', so that to advise a course of action is tantamount to asserting the addressee's capacity to carry it out.⁹ It is however important to realize, as authors of Renaissance courtesy books did, that advice is mere presumption if it is not delivered by an equal.

To offer advyse, unrequested: what is it else but to vaunt youre selfe wiser than he is, whō you do counsell: nay rather it is a playne checke to him, for his Ignorance and folly. And therefore, you must not do so, with all your acquaintance generally: but only with your very friendes, or such whom you are to govern and rule.¹⁰

If the ideal put forward is to be acceptable, the adviser must be accepted as an intimate, and his frank speech as permissible. Plutarch recognized the closeness of frankness to friendship in his analysis of the tricks of the flatterer: αἰσθανόμενος τὴν παρρησίαν καὶ λεγομένην καὶ δοκοῦσαν ἰδίαν εἶναι φωνὴν ὥσπερ τινὸς ζώου τῆς φιλίας, τὸ δ' ἀπαρρησίαστον ἄφιλον καὶ ἀγενές, οὐδὲ ταύτην ἀμίμητον ἀπολέλοιπεν.¹¹

In order to praise Hieron without indecorum, Pindar is thus obliged to establish his own status as comparable to that of Hieron. This procedure, to which the rest of the ode is devoted, resembles Plato's *captatio benevolentiae* in his Second Letter, to Dionysius:

ἐτι δὲ σὺ ἐμὲ τιμῶν καὶ τούτου καθηγούμενος φιλοσοφίαν δόξεις τιμᾶν, καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὅτι διεσκόπεις καὶ ἄλλους, πρὸς πολλῶν εὐδοξίαν σοι οἴσει ὡς φιλοσόφῳ ὄντι. ἐγὼ δὲ σὲ τιμῶν μὴ τιμῶντα πλοῦτον δόξω θαυμάζειν τε καὶ διώκειν, τοῦτο δ' ἴσμεν ὅτι παρὰ πᾶσιν ὄνομα οὐ καλὸν ἔχει· ὡς δ' ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, σοῦ μὲν τιμῶντος ἀμφοτέροις κόσμος, ἐμοῦ δὲ θνείδος ἀμφοῖν.¹²

The status of both will rise if Hieron shows a just appreciation of Pindar's powers. One is reminded of Machiavelli's remark in *The Prince* that a prince should avoid flatterers, but he should not be afraid of the truth but rather ensure that what he hears is the truth by effecting that only the wise man has his ear.¹³ The measure of Pindar's success in establishing his right to address Hieron familiarly is perhaps his inclusion in Plutarch's list of famous pairs of philosophers and kings,¹⁴ along with Solon and Croesus,¹⁵ Plato and Dion, and others.

⁶ cf. the advice given by Isocrates, *Evagoras* 80–1: ἐμὸν μὲν οὖν ἔργον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φίλων τοιαῦτα καὶ λέγειν καὶ γράφειν ἐξ ὧν μέλλομέν σε παροξύνειν ὀρέγεσθαι τούτων, ὥνπερ καὶ νῦν τυγχάνεις ἐπιθυμῶν· σοὶ δὲ προσήκει μηδὲν ἐλλείπειν ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀσκεῖν, ὅπως ἄξιός ᾖσαι καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προγόνων.... ἔστι δ' ἐπὶ σοὶ μὴ διαμαρτεῖν τούτων· ἂν γὰρ ἐμμένῃς φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τοσοῦτον ἐπιδιδῶς ὅσον περ νῦν, ταχέως γενήσῃ τοιοῦτος οἷόν σε προσήκει.

⁷ M. L. West, *Hesiod: Works and Days* (Oxford, 1978), p. 24.

⁸ loc. cit.

⁹ J. M. Redfield, *Nature and Culture in the Iliad* (Chicago, 1975), p. 129. There is a parallel, 'si parva licet componere magnis', in one of the Tswana Praise poems translated in I. Schapera, *Praise Poems of Tswana Chiefs* (Oxford, 1965), p. 155: 'I praised a fine man, | the Disperser, Phedi's brother: | I said, if you want a village, first make it rain...'. Cf. also C. J. Carey, *Maia* n.s. 32 (1980), 148.

¹⁰ Giovanni della Casa, *Galateo*, translated by Robert Peterson (1576; reprinted 1892), p. 80.

¹¹ *Quomodo adulator*... 51c.

¹² 312c 1–d 1.

¹³ Sect. xxiii; p. 126 in the Penguin edition.

¹⁴ op. cit. in n. 11, 69f–70b.

¹⁵ It is possible that Solon fr. 24 West was advice to Croesus, or was interpreted as such by his biographers: M. Lefkowitz, *Lives of the Greek Poets* (London, 1981), p. 45.

The word δὲ leads us to the next stage of the argument, which introduces the just ruler Rhadamanthys, who, unlike the proverbial children, is not fooled by the specious performance of the ape. The ape surely recalls the nature of flatterers, whose apish qualities were proverbial, and Plutarch slips easily into the metaphor in discussing flatterers:

ὁ μὲν γὰρ πίθηκος, ὡς ἔοικε, μιμείσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐπιχειρῶν ἀλίσκεται συγκινούμενος καὶ συνορχούμενος, ὁ δὲ κόλαξ αὐτὸς ἐτέρους ἐπάγεται καὶ παλεύει, μιμούμενος οὐχ ὁμοίως ἅπαντας ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν συνορχούμενος καὶ συνάδων, τῷ δὲ συμπαλαίων καὶ συγκονιόμενος.¹⁶

The good king is able to see through the pretences of flatterers, and hence to appreciate Pindar's true worth.

It is worth noting at this point that Plutarch moves swiftly from the image of the ape to the image of the polyp for the flatterer:¹⁷ τὰς δὲ τοῦ κόλακος ὥσπερ πολύποδος τροπὰς ῥᾶστα φωράσειεν ἄν τις...; yet that doyen of aristocratic poets, Theognis, recommends the nature of the polyp as the best way to self-preservation in an uncertain world.¹⁸ The versatility of the ape or polyp is a virtue for the aristocrat Theognis, as it is for Pindar in his address to an unidentified Amphilochoch (fr. 43 Snell–Maehler) but Pindar seems here to be rejecting such a view for a more demanding and austere ideal in keeping with the absolutism of his addressee. The ability to adapt to one's company, praised in Theognidean circles, is the obverse of the coin whose reverse is treachery. In a society where loyalty must focus on one figure, there is no room for such adaptability. Complaisance must be real and not feigned; the flatterer will surely be found out by a ruler whose mind is fixed firm for blameless virtue. Plutarch's criterion for the true friend as against the flatterer is the consistency of his tastes and behaviour:

πρῶτον μὲν ὁρᾶν δεῖ τὴν ὁμαλότητα τῆς προαιρέσεως καὶ τὸ ἐνδελεχές, εἰ χαίρει τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ... τοιοῦτος γὰρ ὁ φίλος. ὁ δὲ κόλαξ... πρὸς ἕτερον πλάττων καὶ προσαρμόττων ἑαυτὸν οὐχ ἄπλους οὐδ' εἰς ἀλλὰ παντοδαπὸς ἐστι καὶ ποικίλος...¹⁹

Here, then, Pindar is asserting his integrity, his superiority to such flatterers as always surround the courts of kings, and expressing the hope that Hieron will recognize his claims. What he says is honest, and worth listening to. He has rejected the vituperative stance of Archilochus in line 55 and has to avoid falling into the opposite trap of flattery now. It is interesting that at no point in this poem does he attempt to justify his claims by his status as a poet. Pindar comes at the end of that archaic tradition in which a poet spoke truth in virtue of his status as a poet, as divinely inspired. He mistrusts the Muses and the gifts they give: he is *προφάτας* to the Muse's *μάντις*, and his interpretation of her riddling words may be incorrect, so that he has to take the responsibility of right judgement on himself. Hence his invocation of Alatheia in fr. 205 and *O.* 10. 3 f., as a kind of poetical insurance policy.²⁰ He looks forward rather

¹⁶ 52b.

¹⁷ 52f. The point is taken up in the courtesy book of Stefano Guazzo, *Civile Conversation*, translated by G. Pettie (1581; completed by B. Young, 1586); reprinted, ed. by C. Whibley (1925), p. 82: 'a wise man doth never agree to the false prayes of flatterers, who resemble altogether the *Fishe Polypus*'. Interestingly in the present context, Guazzo also has the fox as the type of the devious courtier: 'We must by their example give them (sc. our enemies) mery lookes, and fleer in their faces: we must play the *Foxe* with *Foxes*, and delude art, with art' (ibid. 80–1).

¹⁸ Theognis 215–19. Cf. the recommendations of *ποικιλία*, 213 f., 1071 f.

¹⁹ 52ab. J. Du Bellay, *Les Regrets* CXLII cautions his 'cousin' against 'double estre en paroles... Pour acquérir le bruit d'estre bon courtisan'.

²⁰ I hope to develop this theme at greater length elsewhere.

to the Aristotelian idea of the orator, whose words are believed because he is himself a good man; the idea is commonplace thereafter,²¹ and culminates in the Renaissance theorist's picture of the poet as 'vir optimus laudandi vituperandique peritus'.²² The *sphragis* of the poem,²³ which enshrines his personal claim to the work he offers, concentrates on presenting himself to Hieron as a man of sense rather than a poet. (Cf. line 86 below.)

The asyndeton of line 76 signals a new start at his subject. This kind of progression is characteristic of Pindar's style: having stated a theme (need of praise), he approaches the climax of praise itself, clearing away successive obstacles to the praise (regularly envy, his own incapacity, his plethora of possible material) and stating the *right* way to praise (the need of *καιρός*,²⁴ the avoidance of *κόρος*, and the credibility of the poet). In this I differ slightly from Bundy, who in his invaluable *Studia Pindarica*²⁵ saw a Pindaric ode as a series of crescendos; instead I would regard an ode as a single development, with digressions and diversions, to a final climax. So the final triad of this poem is a climactic point, for which the previous sections – introduction, statement of theme, myth, moralizing – have been preparing the way. These triads have treated of Hieron's power and status within Syracuse, and at 76 Pindar focuses on a more intimate aspect of his theme – Hieron's true nature and the need of a worthy man to utter his praise. In the next lines he turns to the most often cited of impediments to praise, the resultant envy of the less successful. Slander, he says, is an *ἄμαχον κακόν*. Pindar regularly asserts the ultimate uselessness of envy:²⁶ it gets the envier nowhere. The meaning of line 78, though unclear in detail and perhaps corrupt, is not at odds with this interpretation: it asserts that there is no profit in malice.

Lines 79–80, 'although the rest of the tackle is in deep trouble in the sea, I will go un~~un~~submerged like a cork on the surface of the deep', are the chief evidence for those who wish to argue that in this poem Pindar is defending himself against rival poets,²⁷ against false friends,²⁸ against malicious slanderers at Hieron's court,²⁹ or against aristocrats indignant at his cultivation of princes.³⁰ In interpreting this passage it is instructive to consider both the run of the sense as a whole, which is interrupted if Pindar suddenly starts to speak of his own problems, and the analysis of Erasmus Schmid in his commentary of 1616. He labels lines 72 ff. 'Paraeneses ad Hieronem de cavendis obtreptatoribus', and asserts without question the reference of this image to *Hieron's* situation. How can we make this insight intelligible? In one of the rare pieces of perceptiveness in the scholia – albeit couched in gauche terms – the scholiast on *I.* 7. 40 remarks that in Pindar 'I' can often mean 'you'. Pindar writes there (39–42) *ὁ δ' ἀθανάτων μὴ θρασέτω φθόνος, ὅτι τερπνὸν ἐφάμερον διώκων ἔκαλος ἔπειμι γῆρας ἔς τε τὸν μόρσιμον αἰῶνα*.

²¹ cf. n. 34, below.

²² Coluccio Salutati, *Labores Herculis* 2. 13; cf. Osborne B. Hardison, *The Enduring Monument: A Study of the Idea of Praise in Renaissance Literary Theory and Practice* (Chapel Hill, 1962).

²³ Schroeder characterized this section as a *sphragis*. On the *sphragis* see W. Kranz, 'Das Verhältnis des Schöpfers zu seinem Werk in der althellenischen Literatur', *NJb* 53 (1924), 65–86, and 'Sphragis. Ichform und Namensiegel als Eingangs- und Schlussmotiv antiker Dichtung', *RhM* 104 (1961), 3–46 and 97–124 = *Studien* (1967), 27–78.

²⁴ cf. Plut. *Quomodo adulator*... 74d καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὴν παρρησίαν φιλοτεχνεῖν, ὅσῳ μέγιστόν ἐστι καὶ κράτιστον ἐν φιλῷ φάρμακον, εὐστοχίας τε καιροῦ μάλιστα καὶ κράσεως μέτρον ἐχούσης αἰεὶ δεομένην.

²⁵ *Univ. Calif. Publ. in Class. Philol.* 18 (1962), 1 ff. and 35 ff.

²⁶ *N.* 4. 39–43, with *CQ* n.s. 26 (1976), 192; *N.* 1. 24 with *QUCC* n.s. 2 (1979), 65–70.

²⁷ Scholia II. 54 (naming Bacchylides).

²⁸ Schroeder.

²⁹ Dissen, Burton.

³⁰ Wilamowitz.

Although the poet speaks of the gradual advance into old age in his own person, it is clearly the victor being praised who is in fact the focus of attention. 'I' is used in an almost gnomic sense,³¹ and it does not seem unreasonable to interpret our passage in the same way.³² So Pindar is saying here that Hieron can survive the buffets of slander and envy, just as he so often says to his other addressees.³³ Another obstacle to unstinted praise is thus discounted.

The topic of slander surmounted, that of *πίστις* supervenes. For Aristotle, one of the chief requirements of the orator is *ἀξιοπιστία* – to be a persuasive speaker it is in effect necessary to be a good man.³⁴ Pindar cannot be worthy to praise Hieron, or speak at all, if he is *δόλιος*. Again the thought here finds a remarkable echo in the same passage of Max Müller we looked at above:³⁵ 'The true friend of royalty would speak out at Court more even than in Parliament, and nothing keeps up my faith in Gladstone so much as his unpopularity at Court. It is due to such men as Gladstone that monarchy in England has a future.' Well, Pindar is not courting unpopularity here, but he is presenting himself as a *citizen* who is worth listening to. Anyone who fawns on all is hoist with his own petard. Pindar however will stick by his *philoï* (namely Hieron). The ideal is thoroughly Theognidean,³⁶ and the conventional sentiment instantly calls out a polar phrase³⁷ – he will be bitterly hostile to his foes. The reason for this rather startling expression of vengefulness – though less startling in itself in Greek eyes³⁸ – is chiefly to highlight the positive statement, to work as a 'foil' in Bundy's terminology.

In lines 86 ff. Pindar expands on the idea of the man who is not deceitful. The crescendo of types of constitution is *priamel*,³⁹ and hence emphasis on the idea of *euthuglossia*; but it is hard to deny that it is also pertinent to the circumstances of the ode, since Pindar had written also for democracies and for aristocracies. The fact

³¹ For the 'hortatory' first person cf. *N.* 4, 36–43 and art. cit. in *n.* 26, *P.* 11. 54, *N.* 8. 35–7; Lloyd-Jones, *JHS* 93 (1973), 124 n. 96 and works cited there. Cf. also M. Damane and P. B. Sanders, *Lithoko: Sotho Praise Poems* (Oxford, 1974), p. 19: 'A *seroki* may, in his imagination, temporarily identify himself with the chief.'

³² If *εἰμι* is to be read here, the future is gnomic in effect, as often in English: cf. W. W. Goodwin, *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb* (London, 1889), §67.

³³ *I.* 2. 43, *O.* 6. 74–81, *P.* 1. 85, al.

³⁴ Arist. *Rhet.* 1356a 1–7: τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου πορίζομένων πιστέων τρία εἶδη ἔστιν... διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἡθους, ὅταν οὕτω λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα· τοῖς γὰρ ἐπεικέσι πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θάττον. Horace *Ars P.* 330 ff. asks how a man can be a good poet if his soul is corrupt: 'an, haec animos aerugo et cura peculi cum semel imbuerit, speremus carmina fingi posse linenda cedro et levi servanda cupresso?' See also Isoc. *Nicocles* 30; and D. A. Russell, *Criticism in Antiquity* (London, 1981), pp. 81–3 and V. Buchheit, *Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos Epideiktikon von Gorgias bis Aristoteles* (Munich, 1960), sect. 3 B2. 1.

³⁵ Note 5.

³⁶ See for example lines 323–8, loyalty even in the face of slander; 415, hard to find a loyal friend; 979–82, desire for true friendship, deeds not words.

³⁷ On polar expressions and modes of thought in early Greek see G. E. R. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy* (Cambridge, 1966). J. Goody, *The Domestication of the Savage Mind* (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 112–14, argues that such pairing of opposites is characteristic of a literate culture, being based on the application of 'formulae'. His 'formulae' seem however to differ from those of Milman Parry with which he equates them; in so far as polar expressions are formulaic they are relics of an oral mode of composition, analogous to those Homeric similes which abandon their point of departure to delight in their own abundance.

³⁸ Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (California, 1971), p. 40, citing this passage and Archilochus fr. 94 (= 177 West). This is identified, like Solon's behaviour as a wolf among dogs (fr. 35 West), as the conduct of a good citizen by Mary R. Lefkowitz, *The Victory Ode* (New Jersey, 1976), p. 29; cf. *The Lives of the Greek Poets* (London, 1981), p. 42.

³⁹ cf. D. C. Young, *Three Odes of Pindar* (Mnem. suppl. 9, 1968).

that his skill is valued in all these cities emphasizes the true value of what he has to say. The remarks are even more pertinent if we give credence to the report that Hieron forbade *all* speaking in his city.⁴⁰ The absurd story is clearly apocryphal in this form, but if we suppose that Hieron's thought police were sufficiently repressive to compel a prudent silence in most mouths, Pindar's *parrhesia* represents the obtaining of a perhaps unique privilege.

This statement of *axiopiastia* finishes the second section of the conclusion. In 88 a third stage of the argument begins, with another conventional theme which can introduce praise directly: the impermanence of human success, which necessitates its celebration yet reminds man that he is not a god. Only Heracles achieved literal immortality through his deeds, and he is regularly an exemplar precisely of that which man cannot attain.⁴¹

The phraseology here closely echoes that of *I.* 5. 52 f., where the instability of the success Zeus allows is given as a reason for drowning further praise in silence. At *I.* 5. 14–17 the injunction not to wish to become Zeus, to accept man's limitations, leads directly into a celebration of the Isthmian victory. Elsewhere too this theme leads to a statement of the need for celebration (*N.* 11. 13–17, *I.* 3/4. 4–8), or to a statement of the poet's power to celebrate (*P.* 3. 103–6, with 107 ff.). It is possible that there is a consolatory element in the use of the *topos* in *P.* 3 and *I.* 5, and there may be one here too,⁴² perhaps for losing a chariot-race, particularly as no venue of victory is mentioned in the poem. Alternatively the invocation of 'god's disposal' may be a way to avoid emphasizing the limitations imposed on Hieron by his human nature, or even the lability of his throne itself.

Rather unusually, Pindar now returns to the theme of envy, whose efforts as always only 'backfire'. One must, he says, accept one's lot – and now he seems to be speaking as much of himself as of Hieron – and in the last clause he sets himself in full contrast to the *phthoneroi*.⁴³ The futility of their attitude is described at some length, and in a series of not always pellucid metaphors: they pull at the plumbline,⁴⁴ i.e. they try to distort, but of course its upright posture reasserts itself and their intention is frustrated; like St Paul they are kicking against the pricks,⁴⁵ making a truculent stand against what is blindingly obvious. Pindar dissociates himself from such behaviour: it is enough for him to associate with the good.⁴⁶ Given the status Pindar has claimed for himself, that is sufficient praise for Hieron. Pindar values his friendship, the opportunity to associate with him on equal terms. Because Pindar is worthy of Hieron, Hieron is worthy of Pindar. Pindar has fulfilled his part of the bargain, has offered the *apoin' aretas* (14). It has been unusually hard in view of the suspicion with which a tyrant will view his courtiers, and Pindar has had to labour hard to clear away

⁴⁰ 'Hermogenes' *Prolegomena* (Rhet. Graeci 4. 11 Walz): λέγεται ὅτι τοσοῦτον ὀμότητι ἐχρήσατο ὥστε προστάξει τοῖς Συρακοσίοις μηδὲ φθέγγεσθαι τὸ παράπαν· ἀλλὰ διὰ ποδῶν καὶ χειρῶν καὶ ὀμμάτων σημαίνειν τὰ πρόσφορα· καὶ ὡς ἂν τις ἐν χρεῖα γένοιτο, ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν ὀρχηστικὴν λαβεῖν τὰς ἀρχάς· τῷ γὰρ ἀποκεκλείσθαι λόγου τοὺς Συρακοσίους ἐμνηχανῶντο σχήματι δεικνύειν τὰ πράγματα. See E. A. Freeman, *History of Sicily* 2 (Oxford, 1891), p. 542.

⁴¹ e.g. *N.* 3. 19–21, *O.* 3. 43 f.

⁴² It is however a commonplace that Fortune rules even the great; cf. Machiavelli, *The Prince* xxv, Hor. C. 1. 35. 5–12.

⁴³ This echoes the earlier dismissal of the stance of Archilochus (55), which was followed by the statement of Hieron's excellence, *ploutein*, etc. Here, envy is dismissed as irrelevant or short-sighted, in view of mutability.

⁴⁴ On the interpretation see *QUCC* n.s. 2 (1979), 75–7; there is no consistent metaphor here: the envious do not wound themselves *with* a plumbline; the two images are linked by a pun.

⁴⁵ On this proverb see A. Ag. 1624 and Fraenkel's note; fr. adesp. iamb. 13D.

⁴⁶ *P.* 3. 107 ff.

possible misconceptions and to establish his status. A man is known by the company he keeps. Pindar has fitted himself imperceptibly into the tyrant's world while using the conventional topoi of a genre which normally celebrates aristocrats and their families. He has achieved the aim of the Tswana praise-poets:⁴⁷

I shall keep on telling about you,
my voice is now used to you;
I now want to make you my friend,
Hail to you, son of a fine person!

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⁴⁷ cf. Schapera, op. cit. in n. 9, p. 245.